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Case Notes /

Constitutional Law-Korean War Expatriates' Suit

for Back Pay-Judicial Construction of Statutory Provision-Military
Compensation

DURING THE KOREAN WAR, Otho G. Bell, an American soldier, was captured by the
North Koreans and imprisoned. At the termination of hostilities in 1953, he refused
repatriation and went to China. By an administrative order of the Secretary of the
Army, he was dishonorably discharged January 23, 1954.
Subsequently, in mid-1955, Bell returned to the United States and later that year,
with petitioners Cowart and Griggs, filed claims with the Department of the Army
for back pay and allowances to the date of discharge.
On May 22 of this year the Supreme Court held, in Bell v. United States, 366 U.S.
393, 81 Sup. Ct. 1230, 6 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1961), that these petitioners were entitled to
the claimed back pay and allowances, thus reversing the decision of the Court of
Claims reported at 181 F. Supp. 668.
The facts stipulated in both decisions do not paint the petitioners in a very favorable light. In the POW camps each of the three claimants openly consorted with his
Chinese captors, became monitors of forced study groups, distributed propaganda,
made broadcasts, and wore Chinese uniforms. Bell, in particular, wrote articles, stated
lie would fight against the United States, sold food intended for the sick, and caused
a fellow American prisoner to be bayoneted.
In view of the above, the Court of Claims opinion (per Jones, C.J.) included the
following: "Neither the light of reason nor the logic of analysis can possibly justify
the granting of a judgment favorable to these plaintiffs." Bell v. United States (Ct.
Cl.), supra, at 674.
Petitioners demurred to the incriminating facts as irrelevant. They relied instead
on the provisions of the Missing Persons Act, first enacted in 1942 as 56 Stat. 143, and
now codified at 50 U.S.C.A. Appen. §1001 et. seq. Title 1002 of that act reads: "Any
person who is in active service. . and who is. . captured by a hostile force.. shall..
be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same., pay . . to which he
was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence or may become entitled thereafter." [On the right of a POW to recover such pay see: Straughn v. United States,
I Ct. Cl. 324 (1866); Jones v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 197 (1868).]
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The Army's contention in the Supreme Court was that Bell, Cowart, and Griggs
were no longer in active service when they refused to return to this country; but Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, dismissed the Army's
refusal to pay as based on an invalid interpretation of the statute. Citing Walsh v.
United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 225, 231 (1908), he said that the mere fact that an officer or
soldier is under charges does not deprive him of his pay and allowances; such forfeiture can only be imposed by the sentence of a lawful court martial.
The court leaves open the validity of an administrative determination that such
expatriates were absent from active service. In fact the administrative order not to
pay the petitioners (contained in a letter to petitioner's lawyer dated October 2, 1956,
and signed by Major General H. W. Crandall, Chief of Finance, U.S.A.) did not include a determination that they were absent from duty so as to forfeit their pay
according to the statute. In general, the power to make such determinations in the
administration of the Missing Persons Act is stated at 50 U.S.C.A. Appen. §1009.
In summation, Justice Stewart said, "[T]he Congress may some day provide that
members of the Army who fail to live up to a specified code of conduct as prisoners
of war shall forfeit their pay and allowances. Today we hold only that the Army did
not lawfully impose that sanction in this case." Bell v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 1230,
1243 (1961).
Thus the Supreme Court has decided the particular case without, apparently, settling the issue for the future. What would have been the outcome had the Army first
determined that, by their refusal to return, the petitioners were absent from active
service? Absent such finding, the Court was bound by the statute. "The right to compensation. . rests upon, and is governed by, certain statutory provisions and regulations .... These fix the pay to which officers and men are entitled." 15 Op. Atty. Gen.
175 (1876). [On the right to refuse pay to deserters and persons AWOL, see: United
States v. Landers, 92 U.S. 77, 23 Wall. 603 (1876); Dodge v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl.
28 (1897).]
Madden, J., dissenting in the Court of Claims, decried the "judicial re-writing of
statutes," and his opinion and that of Stewart, J., for the Supreme Court both contain
not-so-subtle directions to the legislature to do something about preventing such
situations as that faced by the court here. A similar wish is expressed in Misconduct
in the Prison Camps: A Survey of the Law, and an Analysis of the Korean Cases,
56 Col. L.R. 709, at 794: "Since ideological warfare has changed the concept of what
the detaining power can force or encourage the prisoner of war to do, the military
and the legislature must make appropriate adjustments."
The adequate reformation of existing law can be achieved only by legislation.
Wilson v. District of Columbia, 179 F. 2d 44 (D.C. 1949). A court cannot write into
an act of Congress a provision which Congress affirmatively omitted. Howard Industries v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 337 (Ct. Cl. 1949). The legal necessity of abiding
by the applicable statute will not be debated, but the implications of the instant
holding, together with trends ini military and judicial thinking, could provide controversies for the future.
Example: In Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305, 4 L. Ed. 2d 282
(1960), the Supreme Court reversed the court martial conviction of a civilian employee of the Army in Berlin. Yet at p. 25 of Appellant's Brief for the similar case of
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Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 187, 76 Sup. Ct. 880, 100 L. Ed. 1352 (1956), petition for
rehearing granted, 352 U.S. 901, 77 Sup. Ct. 123, 1 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1957), was the contention that all civilians who accompany the Armed Forces overseas are so closely
identified with these forces as to be indistinguishable from them for all practical purposes. In fact, in the Wilson case, Justice Clark in the majority opinion went so far
as to suggest incorporating those civilian employees who are stationed outside the
United States directly into the armed services, either by compulsory induction or by
voluntary enlistment.
The intimation is there that such civilians should be subject to military justice.
Should they not then be eligible for military benefits? Should they not be able to rely
on the same statutory protection? At this writing, Bruce Wilson, plaintiff in Wilson
v. Bohlender, supra,has petitioned the Court of Claims, claiming back pay and benefits during the period of his illegal detention in Army prisons. While there are differences between his case and that of Otho Bell, the question remains whether judicial
indignation should in either case foreclose their claims.
Bell v. United States points out the need for legislative or administrative action in
the field of military and quasi-military compensation. The determination of the pending Wilson case could well shed light on what form the statutorial revisions will take.
RALPH

Constitutional Law-The Federal Exclusionary Rule-

J. ROHNER

Fourth and

Fifth Amendment Rights-Application to the States.
MAPP, was convicted of possession of obscene literature in violation of the Ohio Penal Code (Ohio Rev. Code §2905.34 1953). The damning evidence
was obtained by forcible entrance into appellant's home by police officers without a
search warrant. When appellant attempted to resist this invasion she was handcuffed
and imprisoned in her bedroom. On the pretext of searching for a fugitive, the officers
pried into suitcases, a chest of drawers and through personal papers. Though the
fugitive was not found, the obscene material forming the basis of the indictment was
seized. Rejecting appellant's contention that the obscenity statute is unconstitutional
under the first and fourteenth amendments and that the evidence is inadmissible, the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld her conviction. (State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166
N.E. 2d 387 (1960)). On certiorari the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held, the
federal exclusionary rule is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The federal exclusionary rule had its origin in the case of Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S.
383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). In that case. the Court barred the use of illegally obtained evidence in federal prosecutions. In so doing, the Court attempted to
APPELLANT, DOLLREE
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inhibit violations of the individual's fourth amendment rights of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The holding in Weeks set the standard in federal
law enforcement. In a later case (Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93
L. Ed. 1782 (1949)) involving the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state court
the Supreme Court held that although the fourth amendment creates a "right to
privacy" which would compel the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of that
right, the use of such evidence in a state criminal proceeding did not violate due
process. Thus, the Court had created a double standard dependent upon the jurisdiction. The Court in the Wolf case blandly enumerated other forms of redress available to the individual. Unfortunately, subsequent considerations of these remedies
indicates that they are illusory at best.
In the instant case Justice Clark, writing for the Court, specifically overruled the
Wolf case. He recognized that the fourth amendment applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the sanctions of the Weeks doctrine in federal
criminal proceedings were imposed on state criminal proceedings. Justice Clark emphasized that to do otherwise would be a granting of a right but a withholding of its
privileges and enjoyment. He severely criticized the "other means" of protection alluded to by the Court in the Wolf case. Justice Clark points out that, in reality, they
have been worthless and futile.
The main argument of the dissent centers on the right of the states to cope with
their own internal problems (i.e., honored autonomy of state judiciaries). Though
this argument is telling and it again underlies the difficulties of imposing objective
standards on an overlapping relationship, it is logical to assume that when the states
refuse to carry out their duties towards the citizenry, the federal government should
intercede to protect this aspect of our dual citizenship. The right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures has been held to be a fundamental right (Wolf
v. Colorado, supra). The holding in the instant case is not a radical departure from
precedent as the dissent argues. Rather, it is the logical culmination of a series of
decisions modifying the Wolf holding. In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct.
292, 100 L.Ed. 233 (1956) the Court precluded state use of evidence illegally obtained
by federal agents. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697,
78 A.L.R. 2d 233 (1960) the Court barred the use, in a federal case, of illegally seized
evidence by someone legitimately on the premises. Subsequently, the use of the "silver
platter" doctrine, allowing admittance in a federal court of evidence illegally obtained by state agents was barred by the Court's holding in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669 (1960).
These decisions, coupled with the holding in the instant case indicate that the
standard of justice hitherto applied by a sometimes callous, sometimes tender judicial
conscience has been replaced by a definite rule. Whether the Court will further abandon the 'conscience test' in related areas of individual rights remains to be seen. In
any event, the law of admissibility of evidence in state criminal proceedings is settled.
In deciding the Constitutional question in the instant case, the Court may be accused of overstepping the bounds of judicial restraint. Nevertheless, the decision
brings a sense of order and reason to a chaotic state created by the Wolf decision.
JEAN PROVOST

